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Abstract: 
Traditional analyses of financial statecraft typically assume the term refers to major 
powers exercising influence over weaker states by such means as foreign aid 
blandishments or banking system sanctions. Newer scholarship highlights the subtler 
political influence advanced capitalist democracies also wield through their centrality to 
global monetary and financial markets and governance networks. Not surprisingly, rising 
powers are keen to expand the venues through which they too can support their larger 
foreign policy visions through tapping into state levers of control over cross-border 
currency, credit, and investment flows, as well as tilting international regulatory reforms 
toward their preferences. The article concludes with a comparison of United States’ and 
China’s financial statecraft capabilities and recent actions. 
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Financial Statecraft: No Longer Limited to the Incumbent Powers  
Traditionally, “financial statecraft” (FS) has been understood to mean the use by a 
powerful state or coalition of states of its control of currency or credit to coerce a less powerful 
rival or client state into altering or ceasing some action that the sanctioning states’ leaders have 
found objectionable (Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho 2014; Steil and Litan 2006). It is thus a 
subset of “economic statecraft,” also understood as a tool of foreign policy pressure (Baldwin 
1985; Cortright and Lopez 2002; Hirschman 1945; Hufbauer et al. 2009). FS therefore implies 
that a major state or states are acting to police the international system, correcting undesirable 
(“rogue”) behavior by a misbehaving country, or occasionally offering a financial incentive for 
diplomatic cooperation. However, new scholarship suggests expanding this traditional 
conceptualization in two directions. First, the scope of FS is broader than coercion or inducement 
with a specific behavioral goal for the target. Financial statecraft includes not only freezing 
banking assets linked to terrorism, but also state-directed foreign investment and loans, currency 
wars, and international financial crisis management (Andrews 2006; Cohen 2015; Helleiner and 
Kirschner 2014; Kirschner 2014; Armijo and Katada 2014). Powerful states employ financial 
and monetary levers to create, constitute, and govern interstate economic relations, as well as the 
shape of global markets. Second, this is an era in which financial power and influence are 
diffusing from the advanced industrial countries, the West plus Japan, to emerging economies 
(Kahler 2016; Zakaria 2012). Rising powers, including China and the other BRICS countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa), as well as Saudi Arabia, have actively employed 
financial statecraft in the hopes of reshaping international institutions, markets, and the choices 
of other states. The universe of cooperating, but also competing, players at the global level is 
increasingly multipolar.  
Section one of this essay1 summarizes the traditional view of international FS and 
proposes an alternative: conceptualizing financial sanctions and global monetary and financial 
governance not as separate activities—the one punitive and discrete, the other high-minded and 
                                                          
1 Thanks to John Harriss for his thoughtful comments on this manuscript. 
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on-going--but rather as a continuum. Sections two and three analyze the differing goals, 
orientations, and instruments through which the United States and China currently practice FS 
and briefly meditate on the ways in which underlying financial power resources shape state 
options and actions. The essay’s fourth section looks to the future. 
The Meaning of Financial Statecraft 
Financial statecraft is here defined as “the use, by the governments of sovereign states, of 
national levers of direct and indirect influence over financial assets, markets, and actors for the 
purpose of achieving larger foreign policy objectives” (see also Armijo and Katada 2014; 
Roberts, Armijo, and Katada 2017). The scope of the term encompasses intentional state actions, 
employing financial or monetary resources, and aimed toward influencing either other states or 
important conditions of the international system. The term also may include defense against the 
use of aggressive FS by rival states. Intentionality is crucial. If the United States Federal Reserve 
Bank lowers interest rates (“quantitative easing”) for the purpose of maintaining domestic 
economic growth following a financial and banking crisis, then this is not FS, even if lower 
financial returns in the United States constitute a factor pushing mobile investors abroad. 
Although foreign capital may flood into Latin America as a result of this policy, we cannot label 
it financial statecraft in the absence of evidence that American policymakers reduced U.S. 
interest rates with the goal of influencing capital flows to Mexico or Argentina. Political leaders’ 
actions that are primarily oriented toward achieving domestic goals thus fall outside of the scope 
of international FS.2 Of course, operationalizing intentionality is never straightforward, raising 
inevitable questions of exactly how one knows what a policymakers’ goals—let alone the goals 
of a sovereign state—are, but the analytical distinction between domestic and foreign policy 
goals is clear. This definition of FS rests on basic rational choice assumptions: states wish to 
survive and prosper economically; they will cooperate for mutual gain, but only if mechanisms 
such as institutions and shared norms exist to assist their leaders in trusting one another; and in 
an environment of international mistrust, state players are more likely to assume and pursue 
zero-sum courses of action. Crucially, this framing of state intentionality by no means excludes a 
                                                          
2 Thanks to Eric Werker for obliging me to clarify this point. 
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significant role for ideas, perceptions, and beliefs in shaping the preferences and assumptions of 
incumbent leaders of sovereign states about how to prosper, whom to trust, and the causal links 
among actions and results (Finnemore 1996:1-33). The definition merely posits that state leaders 
rationally will pursue their perceptions of state interests.  
In other respects, new scholarship suggests modest reconceptualization, summarized in 
the table below, based on Roberts, Armijo, and Katada (2017: 68). A traditional understanding 
assumes that the initiating state (the agent or actor) is either a major power or a coalition led by a 
major power. In an expanded conceptualization, weaker states such as rising or intermediate 
powers also may be active agents, acting alone or in concert. They may not be sufficiently 
powerful to coerce another state, yet often can exercise a critical voice or even constitutive 
power, especially when they are able to join coalitions or coordinate with others.  
The table’s second row compares categories of targets. Where a traditional 
conceptualization focuses on direct influence over another state, an alternative approach also 
identifies as financial statecraft the conscious effort of a state or states to employ levers of credit, 
currency, and regulatory powers to shape the rules, procedures, and culture of global governance 
institutions. Thus in early 2009 the BRICs3 made clear to their fellow members of the Group of 
20 (G20), which had been convened as a world leaders’ summit to sort out the global financial 
crisis of 2007-09, that the expanded financial contributions of these emerging powers to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) would be made in the form of interest-bearing bonds, and 
that they anticipated being rewarded with enlarged voting shares (Roberts, Armijo, and Katada 
2017:81-82). Intentional national government efforts to influence international currency and 
financial markets also qualify as conscious statecraft. For example, disguising the central bank’s 
exchange rate interventions, which almost all states attempt to do, or promoting the enhanced 
international use of one’s own currency, an option realistically open only to a few, both 
constitute efforts at altering the reality of global currency markets.  
The table’s third row highlights the instruments and techniques of financial statecraft, 
traditionally including the incumbent national government’s authority over its home currency, 
                                                          
3 In 2009 South Africa was not yet a member of the BRICs. 
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credit, and financial regulations to sanction or reward another state, for example, by freezing the 
bank accounts of the target’s government officials or, more potently, by denying financial 
institutions from third party jurisdictions access to the sanctioning state’s markets if these 
institutions also transacted with the target state’s institutions or persons. Financial inducements 
 
Table 1. The Dimensions of Financial Statecraft 
 Traditional Conception Expanded Conception Adds 
Actor A major power 
Coalition led by a major power 
Rising powers, alone or in concert 
Target A rival sovereign state Global governance institutions 
International markets 
Instruments & 
techniques 
State influence over its home country 
currency, credit, & regulation of banks & 
financial markets 
State exercise or pursuit of voice 
within global financial governance 
 
State activities to influence 
international currency & capital 
financial markets 
Exercise of state 
power via: 
Offense/coercion 
Cooptation by inducements 
Defense/autonomy 
Exercise of structural power such as 
agenda-setting 
 
also may fit traditional understandings of FS. Most sovereign to sovereign loans, for example, 
typically arrive with explicit or implicit political strings. Credits may also be offered as an 
explicit or implicit quid pro quo for desired behavior, such as voting with one’s benefactor at the 
United Nations or accepting a foreign military base on one’s national territory. A country with a 
stronger currency may offer beneficial swap arrangements to political allies whose currencies 
confront challenges. The right hand column’s expanded conceptualization also includes as FS the 
constitutive and on-going foreign policies underlying a country’s efforts, for example, to achieve 
an enlarged quota at the World Bank, coordinate exchange rate interventions or reserve currency 
choices, or found a new multilateral bank with a different set of countries in charge.  
A fourth dimension in the table highlights the power orientation of a state’s financial 
statecraft efforts. The left hand column includes bilateral efforts by an agent state to influence a 
target state to change its behavior, by either coercion or inducements. The right hand column 
recognizes that financial statecraft also may be essentially defensive, involving a state’s efforts to 
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preserve its financial or monetary autonomy. Thus a debtor state may lobby fiercely to be 
exempted from IMF conditionality, or to have its special circumstances recognized by non-
standard and less onerous loan terms. Finally, a state also might engage in FS via its exercise of 
structural power, employing its favored positions in existing institutions or global networks to set 
agendas or veto innovations (Strange 1998; Oatley et al. 2013). Those state actors involved in 
initially constituting the rules, procedures, and legitimacy formula for an international 
governmental organization very often continue to be advantaged by the specific routines and 
rules even long after the era of the institution’s founding (Germain 1997; Gruber 2000; Stone 
2011). In other words, path dependence and other insights of the historical-institutionalist 
approach in comparative politics (Thelen and Steinmo 1992) are also valid for the study of 
global governance regimes.  
Armed with this expanded conception, the essay reviews several ways in which 
governments in both the United States and the People’s Republic of China have sought to 
achieve larger foreign policy goals by employing FS.  
The United States: The Financial Statecraft of the Incumbent Hegemon 
By the end of the Second World War, the United States was indisputably the world’s 
financial hegemon, as well as its military one.4 American foreign policymakers employed the 
country’s strong current account surplus and deep credit resources to shape global governance 
institutions and fund an international military presence to contain the Soviet Union. The three 
global economic governance institutions created at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference—a 
multilateral trade organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—
resulted from American and Allied financial statecraft (Frieden 2006: 254-263, 278-300; 
Helleiner 1994).  
The Bretton Woods trio have been so successful that many observers only dimly perceive 
the scaffolding that these institutions continue to provide for international economic interactions. 
In the financial realm, the IMF had the mission of providing emergency loans to countries with 
                                                          
4 The discussion in this section and the next draws on ideas and data developed in Armijo, Tirone, and Chey 2017. 
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short-term yet systemically-disruptive liquidity problems. The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank) stood ready to make long-term loans 
from “the world” to countries needing to build or rebuild infrastructure and heavy industry. The 
Bretton Woods regime was conceived, promoted, and largely funded by the United States and to 
a lesser extent Britain, and would not have come into being had they not possessed both the 
vision and the financial resources. The United States also employed its resources as the world’s 
major creditor state to push both its defeated enemies and its allies toward positions they did not 
eagerly embrace, for example, providing irresistible incentives and persuasion to bitter enemies 
France and Germany to integrate their economies through the European Coal and Steel 
Community, precursor of the European Union. These actions defined the postwar world.  
Another pillar of postwar American financial statecraft was the U.S. dollar-exchange 
international monetary standard. During the 1920s and early 1930s major countries, especially 
Britain, had attempted to reinstate the gold standard, in which national currencies would be 
quoted in and convertible to gold. The limited amount of gold in the world meant that any such 
regime was often harshly deflationary in its effects on domestic populations. Alternatively, 
policymakers in weak governments simply gave up, concluding that their only alternative for 
public finance was inflationary spending. Subsequently, postwar leaders blamed volatile and 
punishing prewar macroeconomic conditions for the receptiveness of European populations to 
extremist and belligerent political ideologies. By this logic, stabilizing the global trade and 
payments systems and supporting well-functioning national economies was an urgent postwar 
political imperative. From the 1950s onward, the liquidity necessary to support the dramatic 
expansion of international trade and global growth derived from the combination of American 
government spending worldwide and the willingness of the central banks and firms of other 
countries to hold U.S. dollars as a store of value. The United States government therefore could 
expand the money supply at a rate exceeding the needs of the domestic economy, receiving 
additional seigniorage and consumption benefits. The U.S. dollar was the global reserve, 
transactions, and accounting currency. 
The United States lost its formerly robust merchandise trade surplus in the early 1970s, 
provoking a shift in American financial statecraft. U.S. policymakers abruptly announced that 
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the dollar was no longer convertible into gold and implemented a temporary yet across-all-goods 
tariff of 10 percent, effective immediately (Frieden 2006:339-360; Block 1978). Other major 
countries were obliged to accept these dramatic shifts in the global payments regime. 
Subsequently, in the mid-1970s, the United States instigated the informal yet extremely 
consequential steering group for the global economy, the Group of Seven (G7), composed of 
finance ministers and central bank governors from the largest advanced capitalist democracies: 
Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States (Bergsten and Henning 
1996). Throughout the late twentieth century, as key regulatory and normative components of the 
Bretton Woods system—including the major power consensus on the desirability of fixed 
exchange rates and significant controls on international capital movements—came to be seen by 
the most senior United States economic policymakers as impediments to American growth, the 
United States broke the rules of the old system and innovated ones more to its liking. In the 
absence of alternative viable leadership, other countries grumbled but went along. 
Global financial governance leadership by the United States and its major allies among 
the industrialized democracies has provided the backdrop to international political relations from 
then until now, with American leaders on key occasions exerting their leadership even vis-à-vis 
their closest collaborators. In the midst of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, senior 
United States policymakers resisted Japan’s attempts to play a more active role (Laurence 2002). 
As the acute phase wound down, the European major powers sought to institutionalize greater 
international coordination and oversight of national banking regulations, creating the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF). Presciently, the U.S. complained of the lack of members from emerging 
economies, as the FSF had only Singapore and Hong Kong, and convened the G20 (which 
included most of the larger emerging powers as members, as well as the EU) with the wider but 
vaguer mandate of debating reforms of the global financial architecture (Armijo 2002; Blecker 
1999). In practice, the G20 lacked the clout to pursue significant reforms of the global financial 
architecture once the issue dropped off the United States’ core foreign policy agenda, as 
happened fairly quickly. However, the G20 was suddenly elevated to high salience once U.S. 
President George W. Bush and his advisors decided in October 2008 that a more representative 
body than the G7 was needed—in this instance to provide a leadership forum for collective 
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management of spreading ripples from the United States’ subprime mortgage-lending crisis, 
which was rapidly becoming the global financial crisis of 2008-09 (Kirshner 2014).  
Of course, American FS also has included the more obvious categories of bilateral grants 
and subsidized credits (foreign assistance), as well as banking and financial sanctions. Overseas 
loans and grants for both military and development purposes represented over 1 percent of the 
American economy from the end of the Second World War through the mid-1950s, peaking at 
about $65 billion, in constant 2015 U.S. dollars, in 1950. With the end of the Cold War in the 
early 1990s, foreign aid fell to only about 0.2 percent United States GDP, rising to around 0.4 
percent since the World Trade Center bombing in September 2001, mainly corresponding to 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, clearly related to U.S. foreign policy priorities rather than 
development or poverty-reduction (Tarnoff and Larsen 2016:16). Although the United States 
continues to top the list of reporting donors, mainly advanced industrial democracies, in terms of 
absolute amounts of official development assistance (ODA) extended, it is not among the top ten 
donors when aid is calculated as a share of its national economy.5  
The United States has continued to use financial sanctions, recently against Iran and 
Russia. The U.S.-organized collective sanctions between the mid-1990s and 2015 on Iran were 
intended to pressure that country to allow full external inspections of its nuclear energy 
development program to ensure that it had only civilian goals.6 In 2014, other Western countries 
joined the United States in freezing the bank accounts of Russian individuals, firms, and state 
entities in response to Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea. These actions led the 
BRICS group to unite in support of Russian resistance to Western financial sanctions, despite the 
discomfort of the other four governments with Russian revanchism (Roberts, Armijo, and Katada 
2017:88-92). Recently, U.S. policymakers also have become more active users of defensive 
varieties of financial statecraft, for example, in 2017 blocking the sale of a chipmaker to China 
on national security grounds (Donnan and Hook 2017). 
                                                          
5 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/08/foreign-aid-these-countries-are-the-most-generous/ 
6 Although collective Western sanctions associated with Iran’s nuclear program were lifted in 2015, United States 
President Trump has frequently threatened to reimpose them, leading many foreign investors to continue to shun 
Iran. Haass 2017. 
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American leadership in all of these instances involved conscious government 
employment of the country’s capabilities for the larger foreign policy aim of constructing a 
stable postwar world and ensuring the United States’ central position within it. Over time, the 
dominant forms of American financial statecraft have shifted. In the mid-twentieth century U.S. 
policymakers articulated a grand vision of postwar reconstruction and the spread of democracy 
to societies ravaged by extremist ideologies. Under recent presidential administrations from Bill 
Clinton (inaugurated January 1993) through Barak Obama (left office January 2017), United 
States innovation in global financial governance was crisis-driven and quickly discontinued once 
the acute stage had passed, rather than visionary and sustained. Their successor, Donald Trump, 
has been openly contemptuous of global governance institutions. The United States presence in 
foreign assistance has shrunk relative to earlier periods and to that of other governments. In the 
early twenty-first century, however, the United States was active in imposing financial sanctions, 
which employ the power resources of a country with large and liquid home financial markets and 
globally-dominant financial institutions, but unlike foreign aid do not require budgetary 
resources. Restricting foreign access to American capital markets is relatively costless in the 
short run, although it does stimulate foreigners to switch to alternative jurisdictions, with 
potentially heavy costs to the American financial services industry over the medium run.  
China: The Financial Statecraft of the Emerging Challenger 
China has pursued different varieties of international financial statecraft than the United 
States. During the 1980s and 1990s, policymakers were mainly concerned to defend the country 
against dangers originating in the global economy. Policymakers steadily increased the share of 
trade in China’s economy, but without liberalizing capital flows. Inward foreign direct 
investment flows continue to be carefully monitored by Beijing, with a great many sectors and 
locales proscribed, and portfolio capital flows are even more restricted. China largely escaped 
direct effects from the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, largely because its corporate sector 
(dominated by state-owned yet increasingly independently-managed banks and firms) was 
forbidden to engage in the so-called carry trade, by which banks and firms borrowed 
internationally at cheaper interest rates than could be found at home. Elsewhere in East Asia 
corporations and banks contracted loans abroad more freely, but frequently did so without 
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adequately insuring themselves against their foreign exchange risk, creating aggregate 
vulnerabilities for the economy as a whole in neighbors such as Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and South Korea, Like virtually all of Asia, China had a mostly fixed exchange rate, 
pegged to the U.S. dollar, yet due to the greater control the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
maintained over capital flows, the contagion effects from the Asian financial crisis of the late 
1990s also were subdued within China. Nonetheless, the lesson taken in Beijing was that foreign 
exchange reserves needed to be increased. The PBC thus expanded its holdings of U.S. Treasury 
securities, and in 2009 China surpassed Japan as the largest foreign owner of the United States 
public debt.  
Larger foreign exchange holdings by the central bank exacerbated two problems for 
Chinese policymakers, however. First, the tradeoff made by foreign sovereign investors such as 
the PBC for the safety and liquidity of U.S. Treasury bonds was an extremely low rate of return. 
China’s initial response to this problem was to create sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to invest 
some portion of central government holdings of foreign currency in more lucrative assets abroad, 
including via foreign direct investment (FDI) in advanced industrial country markets. Although 
liquidity for SWF assets necessarily was lower than with U.S. Treasury holdings, earnings would 
be higher. In the United States and elsewhere, however, Chinese FDI inflows in the early twenty-
first century proved even more controversial than Japanese FDI inflows had been in the 1980s 
(for example, Cohen 2008).7 A second problem for Chinese policymakers that follows from 
China’s buildup of foreign exchange reserves has been that higher USD holdings by the Chinese 
government rub salt in the already wounded U.S.-China relationship. Increased demand in China 
and elsewhere to hold dollars strengthens the dollar and exerts downward pressure on the 
Chinese yuan (also known as the renminbi, RMB). This worsens the American trade deficit with 
China, which the Americans blame on deliberate exchange rate undervaluation by China and the 
Chinese on uncompetitive U.S. products.  
Here the comparison of the trajectory of Chinese as contrasted to American FS becomes 
more complex, with the categories in need of careful specification. The foreign investment 
                                                          
7 Chinese flight capital invested in Western countries is also huge, but doesn’t constitute Chinese FS, as these are not 
government-managed capital flows. The Asia Society estimated that China was the leading foreign real estate 
investor in the US, with a cumulative $350 billion invested through 2015. Bullough 2017.  
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decisions of American private firms and banks are not directed by the United States government. 
Only when those firms tip into conflicts abroad, as when their factories face nationalization or 
their sovereign lending suffers a default, do they call on the state to assert itself on their behalf. 
Thus the 1970s expansion in lending to developing countries in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe by Western and Japanese banks was not financial statecraft, but the involvement of 
senior government financial officials in forming multilateral creditor negotiating committees, 
and preventing creation of what was denounced as a “debtor cartel” by Latin American 
borrowing countries, was FS (Biersteker 1993). In contrast, at present most long-term Chinese 
investment capital sent abroad through public channels arrives via government banks and firms. 
Often paired with an implicit or explicit political quid pro quo, it is appropriately considered 
financial statecraft, although its foreign policy goals generally are more diffuse and longer-term 
than is the case with financial sanctions.  
Given increasing political resistance from advanced industrial destinations including 
North America, Western Europe, and Australia, it has been politically easier for China to direct 
its investible funds to the global South, and increasingly these destinations have been chosen. 
Summing official development assistance and other official credits such as commercial credits 
from public sector banks, but excluding military aid, the total of Chinese bilateral credits from 
2000-2014 was $354 billion (in constant 2016 USD), close to the cumulative U.S. total of all 
government-allocated foreign grants and credits of $395 billion. Since 2009, China’s annual total 
has exceeded or matched that of the United States, suggesting an increasing trend in future.8 
China’s concessional finance mainly targets Cuba and sub-Saharan Africa, while the commercial 
credits principally go to middle income commodity producers, including Russia, throughout the 
global South and in transition economies. However, and unlike the United States, China cannot 
at present employ its home country capital markets--which remain small, opaque, and poorly 
regulated—to impose financial sanctions on other states. 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the upswing in the international commodity 
price cycle led China to increase capital flows dramatically to producers of commodities, 
including bulk foodstuffs such as soya, wheat, and meat, as well as the fossil fuels and minerals 
                                                          
8 Dreher, et al. 2017. 
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essential to sophisticated industrial production. Most of these loans and FDI went to South 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa (EIU 2016; Irwin and Gallagher 2014). By the second decade 
the focus of China’s outward flows was shifting. In 2013 China announced the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), an enormous portfolio of infrastructure projects for Eurasia, composed of six 
“roads” radiating from China to the North, West, and South, as well as a mostly maritime 
corridor from Southeast Asia to Northeast Africa. These mostly bilateral projects (China and a 
neighbor) come with an enticing chunk of Chinese financing, and embody Chinese priorities, 
which include both improved commercial access and frequent national security quid pro quos, 
such as new military bases and the right for the Chinese Navy to dock at commercial ports built 
through the initiative. The Economist (2017) writes, “This is the kind of leadership America has 
not shown since the post-war days of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe (which was 
considerably smaller).” 
Moreover, China today is increasingly interested in pursuing structural power in the 
global political economy (Gracie 2017; Helleiner and Kirshner 2014; Roberts, Armijo, and 
Katada 2017; Rudd 2017). In concert with its fellow members of the BRICS countries, China has 
used collective financial statecraft to pursue reforms of the voting and appointments processes 
and embodied economic ideologies within the IMF and World Bank. China also may be 
expected to become more assertive within other multilateral forums such as the Financial 
Stability Board (successor to the FSF) and G20. Alone or with partners, China has created new 
Southern-dominated multilateral financial institutions, including the New Development Bank, 
Contingent Reserve Agreement, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, all in 2015-2016. 
The other BRICS have supported China’s push to internationalize the RMB and jointly promoted 
the inclusion of the RMB as only the fifth currency in the basket composing the IMF’s quasi-
currency, the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), used for denominating IMF loans.  
Shifts in Financial Statecraft in the Twenty-First Century? 
While some have understood “financial statecraft” as a subset of coercive economic 
statecraft, this chapter proposes applying the term to embrace the full range of foreign policy 
goals that may be pursued by a sovereign state via an incumbent government’s manipulation of 
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the credit, currency, financial institutions, and financial regulatory regimes that come under its 
legal jurisdiction or de facto reach. Such statecraft may be bilateral or collective, have immediate 
or longer term aims, and may be pursued by means as varied as foreign aid, banking sanctions, 
exchange rate manipulation, attempts to shift other countries’ reserve currency preferences, or 
participation in the design or execution of global financial governance.  
The set of major players engaged in financial statecraft has evolved, as have the types of 
globally-relevant financial resources on which these major states can draw. During the Cold 
War, financial statecraft was overwhelmingly dominated by the United States and its G7 allies. 
However, since the early 2000s significant new players, notably China, have joined this game. 
The material basis underlying the FS of the existing hegemon, the United States, is the breadth, 
sophistication, and liquidity of its home financial markets, a financial power resource that 
continues to support the considerable path dependence in a global economy founded on a U.S. 
dollar-exchange currency regime. But America now lacks the deep pockets that it did in the mid-
twentieth century, and is no longer the world’s creditor. The advantage from having a large 
investible surplus, as measured by either domestic savings or foreign exchange reserves, now lies 
with China. China has become a major creditor state, while America is the largest debtor state, 
only partially due to its reputation as a “safe haven” for mobile capital from nervous investors 
and governments worldwide. To the extent that constructing future global financial governance 
regimes requires commitment of real resources, in the future China will play a larger role and the 
United States a smaller one. 
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